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sue for the reasonable value of his services. See Fitzgerald v. Allen, 128 Mass. 232
(i88o); Edinglon v. Pickle, i Sneed (Tenn.) 122 (1853).
(2) A partial assignment of the chose in action. Powdl v. Galveston Ry. Co., 78 S.W.
975 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904). In this case the attorney need not sue for damages for
breach of contract but may sue in equity in his own name on the original claim joining
his client as party defendant. See Warren v. First National Bank, 149 Ill. 9, 38 N.E.
122 (1893). In order to decide that there is a partial assignment, courts require definite
evidence showing a present intention to pass ownership of part of the claim. Hargett v.
McCadden, 107 Ga. 773, 33 S.E. 666 (1899). This theory is not available where the
client's cause of action is for personal injuries. Weller v. Jersey City H. & P. St. Ry.
Co., 68 N.J. Eq. 659, 57 Atl. 730 (1904).
(3) Partial assignment of the fund to be recovered. Where the transaction is held to
be of this type, the attorney may recover his portion of the proceeds which have been
recovered without the intervention of the client. Wylie v. Coxe, 15 How. (U.S.) 415
(1853); Canty v. Latterner,3x Minn. 239, 17 N.W. 385 (1883). This type of transaction
is available even where the basis of the client's claim is personal injury. Dreibundv.
Candler, 166 Mich. 49, 131 N.W. 129 (1911). This theory, on which a claim for an
equitable lien is usually founded, has raised difficult questions of construction. Some
courts have been willing to hold that the fact of a contingent fee contract is alone adequate evidence of an intent to assign part of the fund. Wylie v. Coxe, 15 How. (U.S.)
415 (I853). Others hold this alone not to be sufficient evidence. Tone v. Shankland,
iro Ia. 525, 81 N.W. 789 (igoo). Decisions in Illinois are especially illustrative of the
general confusion on this point. Smith v. Young, 62 Ill. 210 (1871); Cameron v. Boeger,
200 Ill. 84, 65 N.E. 69o (1902).

(4) A promise to pay out of the proceed when collected. This type of transaction
does not create a lien on the fund. Holmes v. Bell, 139 App. Div. 455, 124 N.Y.S. 30
(igo); i Williston, Contracts (1921), § 429; but see Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U.S. 335
(1908).

In the present case, there being no evidence of a partial assignment of the client's
chose in action, the decision of the court in allowing recovery would seem questionable.
The court apparently decided the case on the theory that there was an assignment of
the fund to be recovered. However, in fact, nothing had been recovered on the claim.
Business Trusts-Contract Liability of Trustees-[Ilinois].-A business trust
declaration provided that trustees were to be "under no personal obligation or liability
of any kind," and that in all contracts made by the trustees "specific mention shall be
made therein of the trust to the end that any and all parties must look solely to the
trust estate and the trust fund for any claim arising out of such trust." In a suit on a
contract against the trustees personally, held, even if the plaintiff had knowledge of the
terms of the trust instrument, the trustees are personally liable, not having expressly
stipulated in the contract against personal liability. Review Printingand Stationery
Co. V.McCoy, 276 Ill. App. 58o (1934).
Trustees of a business trust, like ordinary trustees, being principals and not agents,
are personally liable on contracts made by them in the course of trust administration.
Betts v. Hackathorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252 S.W. 602 (1923); Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal.
408, 292 Pac. 624 (1930); Darlingv. Buddy, 318 Mo. 784, 1 S.W. (2d) 163 (1927); but
see H. Kempner v. Welker, 36 Ariz. 128, 283 Pac. 284 (1929). Moreover, trustees of a
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business trust, as other trustees, can exempt themselves from personal liability on contracts by an express stipulation in the contract. Carpenter v. Sly Co., iog Cal. App.
539, 293 Pac. x62 (193 o ) ; Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N.E. 250 (1927);
Rand v. Farquhar,226 Mass. 9 i , 115 N.E. 286 (1917). Where there is no express stipulation against personal liability in the contract but the contracting parties have actual
knowledge of the trustees' exemption from liability in the trust declaration, it has been
said that here, too, the trustee is personally liable. See Alleghany Tank Car Co. v. Culbertson, 288 Fed. 4o6 (D.C.N.D. Tex. 1923); Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292
Pac. 624 (1930); Austin v. Parker,317 Ill. 348, 148 N.E. 19 (1925); Walker v. Hatfield,
17 S.W. (2d) 357 (Kan. City Ct. of Appeals, 1929); Carrv. Leahy, 217 Mass. 438, ,o5
N.E. 445 (1914); Mitchell v. Whitlock, 121 N.C. 166, 28 S.E. 292 (1897); Hildebrand,
Liability of the Trustees, Property, and Shareholders of a Massachusetts Trust, 2 Tex.
L. Rev. 139 (1924). There may be doubt, however, whether that is the rule even in the
case of pure trusts. See Glenn v. Allison, 58 Md. 527 (i888); Restatement of Trusts
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1933), § 255, comment (b); and even though that is the rule in a
pure trust, the assimilation of the business trust, in some respects, to the corporation
may warrant the application of another rule. Cf. Magruder, The Position of Shareholders in Business Trusts, 23 Col. L. Rev. 423 (1923).
Some courts have held that knowledge of such a provision is to be considered with
other circumstances in determining whether it was the intent of the parties that the
trustees were not to be personally liable. Boyle v. Rider, 136 Md. 286, iio At. 524
(1920);

William Lindke Land Co. v. Kalman, 19o Minn. 6or,

252

N.W. 650 (X934); 18

Minn. L. Rev. 86o (1934); see Larson v. Sylvester, 282 Mass. 352, 185 N.E. 44 (1933).
A parol stipulation has been recognized as sufficient to prevent personal liability of the
trustees where the business trust device is considered as a partnership. Shelton v.
Montoya Oil & Gas Co., 292 S.W. 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Farmers' State Bank
& Trust Co. v. Gorman Home Refinery, 3 S.W. (2d) 65 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). Furthermore it has been held that reference in the contract to the trust instrument, which
has a provision excluding personal liability of the trustees, relieves the trustee of personal liability whether or not the creditor knew of the provision. Bank of Topeka v.
Eaton, roo Fed. 8 (C.C.D. Mass. 9oo), affd. 107 Fed. ioo3 (C.C.A. ist x9oi), cert. denied, 183 U.S. 697 (1901). Knowledge by the creditor of an attempted limitation of
liability has been held to limit liability that would otherwise prevail in other situations.
Such knowledge has been held effective in the case of shareholders in a business trust
which does not shield them from liability; McCarthy v. Parker,243 Mass. 465, 138 N.E.
8 (1923); Roberts v. Aberdeen-Southern Pines Syndicate, 198 N.C. 381, 151 S.E. 865
(193o); Warren, Corporate Advantages without Incorporation (1929), 355; contra:
Thompson v. Schmitt, iuS Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 554 (1925); and in the case of shareholders
in a defectively organized corporation; Ballantine, Corporations (1927), §§ 28, 29; but
not in the case of members of a defective limited partnership; Andrews v. Schoot, co
Pa. St. 47 (1848); R. S. Oglesby Co. v. Lindsey, 112 Va. 767, 72 S.E. 672 (1911); see i
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 81 5 (1934).
Constitutional Law-Price Discrimination-New York Milk Control Bill[U.S.].-Plaintiffs brought a bill to enjoin the enforcement of the section of the New
York Agriculture and Markets Law which permits milk dealers not having a "welladvertised trade name" to sell to stores at one cent less than "trade name" dealers of

